A marital separation agreement is a contract in which spouses settle property, support, and parenting issues on their own terms.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has long held that spouses ending a marriage may enter into a binding agreement settling all questions of property and support, and that such agreements should be encouraged. Le Bert-Francis v. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C. 1963).
Because a divorce may now be granted on either spouse’s assertion that they no longer wish to remain married, D.C. Code § 16-904(a), the agreement does establish grounds, and outlines terms, and a complete agreement allows the divorce to proceed uncontested with court’s approval.
The parameters of the agreement:
A DC agreement resolves the issues the Superior Court would otherwise decide under D.C. Code §§ 16-910 (property and debt), 16-913 (alimony), 16-914 (custody), and 16-916.01 (child support). The Court of Appeals enforced an agreement covering custody, visitation, proceeds from the sale of the home, life insurance, retirement funds, the child’s health insurance, the absence of marital debt, and child support. Duffy v. Duffy, 881 A.2d 630, 634-35 (D.C. 2005). Typical provisions include:
- Property: classification of marital and separate property; disposition of the marital home
- Retirement: division of pensions and retirement accounts, implemented by qualified domestic relations order
- Debt: allocation of joint and individual liabilities
- Alimony: amount, indefinite or fixed term, terminating events, modifiability, or waiver
- Custody: legal custody, physical custody, and a parenting schedule
- Child support: guideline amount or a justified departure; medical expenses and health coverage
- Life insurance: coverage securing support obligations
- Taxes: filing status, dependency claims, and the tax consequences of the division
Validity in the District:
DC treats a separation agreement as a contract. It is enforceable where the parties agreed to all material terms and intended to be bound. Duffy, 881 A.2d at 634. In Duffy, a signed letter met that standard, and a year and a half of performance confirmed the intent to be bound. Id. at 634-35, 637.
An agreement is not presumptively invalid, and the spouse attacking it bears the burden of proof. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d at 663-64. An agreement fair on its face is presumed valid; one unfair on its face raises a rebuttable presumption of invalidity. Id. at 664.
The grounds for setting an agreement aside are fraud, duress, concealment, and overreaching. Davis v. Davis, 268 A.2d 515, 517 (D.C. 1970). A bargain that proves unwise is not one of them. Id. Concealment is a ground to set an agreement aside, Davis, 268 A.2d at 517, but the proponent bears no affirmative burden to prove full disclosure. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d at 663-64. Complete financial disclosure, recited in the agreement, is therefore the practical safeguard against a concealment claim.
Enforceability in the District:
A valid and equitable agreement displaces the court’s statutory authority over property. The court divides property only in the absence of a valid antenuptial or postnuptial agreement resolving those issues. D.C. Code § 16-910(a). A fair and reasonable agreement intended as a final disposition of property or adult support binds the parties. Swift v. Swift, 566 A.2d 1045, 1046 (D.C. 1989).
Terms concerning children remain subject to judicial oversight. The court must enter an agreed custody arrangement unless clear and convincing evidence shows it is contrary to the child’s best interest. D.C. Code § 16-914(h). Where agreed child support departs from the guideline, the judge must find the amount fair and just and state the reasons in writing. D.C. Code § 16-916.01(o).
The child’s interest is primary to any agreement between the parents, and child support provisions remain open to modification on a proper showing. Davis, 268 A.2d at 517.
Merger and Incorporation:
The merger clause determines how the agreement is enforced and how it may be changed. A merged agreement is adopted by the court as its own determination and may be modified on a material change in circumstances. Hamel v. Hamel, 539 A.2d 195, 198-99 (D.C. 1988). As a court order, it is enforced like any other, and support arrearages ripen into money judgments. Padgett v. Padgett, 472 A.2d 849, 852 (D.C. 1984).
An agreement incorporated but not merged survives as a contract governed by contract law. Swift, 566 A.2d at 1048. It may be modified only on a substantial and material change in circumstances unforeseen when it was signed. Id. at 1047. An unmerged agreement is enforced through contract remedies such as specific performance and damages. Clark v. Clark, 535 A.2d 872, 873-74, 876 (D.C. 1987).
The distinction is substantive. A court has no authority to modify a separation agreement that was not merged into the divorce decree, Norris v. Norris, 473 A.2d 380, 381 (D.C. 1984), except as statutory requirements or court-developed standards permit. Hamel, 539 A.2d at 199 n.5. A non-merger clause cannot be read to allow modification at the court’s discretion. Swift, 566 A.2d at 1048.
Incentives to settle:
Without an agreement, a judge awards alimony “if it seems just and proper,” D.C. Code § 16-913(a), and divides property in a manner the judge finds “equitable, just, and reasonable.” D.C. Code § 16-910(a)(2). Those standards confer broad discretion, and the outcome rests with the court.
The Court of Appeals has recognized that spouses are in most instances better positioned than a court to determine what is fair, and that agreements are made to avoid litigation. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d at 664. A well-drafted agreement spares the parties the cost of a contested trial and lets them leave the marriage on terms they chose rather than terms imposed in a courtroom.
There are times though that despite best efforts, a resolution short of litigation is untenable. In those cases, having an experience, seasoned trial lawyer can shape and dictate the outcome.
Refer to our Washington DC Divorce lawyer page for more detailed information. We specialize in high net worth divorce and litigation.
