In Allen v. Whitehead, No. 25-FM-0607 (D.C. Sept. 3, 2026), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s dismissal of a civil protection order petition, holding that a paternal grandmother vested with sole legal custody of her grandchildren qualifies as a “family member” of the children’s biological mother under the Intrafamily Offenses Act, D.C. Code § 16-1001 et seq.
Factual Background
Fonda Allen, the paternal grandmother, was awarded permanent sole legal and physical custody of her two grandchildren in a prior custody proceeding. Tamieka Whitehead, the children’s biological mother, retained monthly supervised visitation. Allen thereafter petitioned for a civil protection order, alleging that Whitehead banged loudly on her front door, yelled obscenities, and threatened to kill her. Before Whitehead was served, the trial court dismissed the petition sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.
The Statutory Framework
The Intrafamily Offenses Act permits a person to petition for a civil protection order against one who has committed an “intrafamily offense,” defined as an offense punishable as a criminal offense against a “family member.” D.C. Code § 16-1001(8)(A); id. § 16-1003(a)(1). “Family member” includes a person “to whom the offender is related by blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, or domestic partnership.” Id. § 16-1001(5A)(A). “Legal custody” is defined as legal responsibility for a child, encompassing decision-making authority over health, education, and general welfare. Id. § 16-914(a)(1)(B)(i).
The definition is disjunctive — the five listed relationships are connected by “or,” so any single basis is independently sufficient. The Act also extends protection to persons who share a residence or have a child in common, reflecting the Council’s recognition that family relationships extend beyond traditional blood and marriage ties. The Act’s remedial purpose requires liberal construction in favor of the class it is intended to protect. Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1034 (D.C. 2015).
Trial Court Analysis
The trial court concluded Allen was not Whitehead’s “family member.” It rejected Allen’s argument that the parties were related by legal custody, reasoning that legal custody did not establish the requisite familial relationship. The court further found no relationship by blood, marriage, adoption, or domestic partnership, and therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Appellate Review
Reviewing de novo, the Court of Appeals began with the statutory text. It construed “related” narrowly, as connected by kinship, and parsed the definition’s components — related by blood, adoption, legal custody, or marriage — connected by “or.” The court held that Allen and Whitehead are related by blood through their shared biological relationship to the children, and separately related by legal custody through Allen’s court-ordered custodial authority. Either basis independently satisfies the definition; together, they compel the conclusion that Allen is Whitehead’s family member.
The court reinforced this reading with the Act’s remedial purpose, noting that the Intrafamily Offenses Act “should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect,” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1034 (D.C. 2015), and with legislative history reflecting the Council’s intent to broaden the Act to fit non-traditional family structures, including grandparent caretakers.
The court also rejected the trial court’s narrow construction of “legal custody” as merely a custodial arrangement. It reasoned that legal custody carries with it the legal responsibility and authority over a child’s welfare, which necessarily creates a familial relationship between the custodian and the child’s other parent. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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