In Hershey v. Hershey, decided on August 7, 2025, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed core interpretive questions under the District’s child-support statute, D.C. Code § 16-916.01, in the context of a post-divorce modification proceeding involving three minor children residing primarily with their mother.
The parties, Dr. Christopher Hershey and Ms. Rebecca Hershey, had incorporated a child-support agreement into their final divorce order, pegging monthly payments at $3817.28 using the so-called “Holland formula” for cases where combined adjusted gross income exceeds two-hundred-forty-thousand dollars. Post-divorce, Dr. Hershey sought reduction based on alleged income shifts, while Ms. Hershey pursued discovery enforcement, sanctions, and attorney’s fees.
The Superior Court temporarily lowered support, then reinstated a permanent order of three-thousand-eight-hundred-seventeen dollars and twenty-eight cents monthly—again applying the Holland formula, declining to “gross up” Dr. Hershey’s nontaxable veteran’s disability benefit of four-thousand-five-hundred-thirteen dollars. That is, the Court declined to adjust for taxes the father’s non-taxable veteran’s benefit, focusing on actual income for support. Moreover, the Court excluded a claimed six-thousand-dollar extraordinary medical expense for lack of proof, and denied fees/sanctions without detailed rationale.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s discretion to employ the Holland formula under § 16-916.01(h), citing Builta v. Guzmán, 324 A.3d 269 (D.C. 2024), as authority that such guidelines remain “frequently useful and appropriate” in high-income scenarios where statutory schedules no longer scale linearly. The panel emphasized that judges must first anchor awards to children’s actual needs—drawn from family lifestyle—before deviating upward.
The Court reversed and remanded, however, on three key errors.
First, it held that nontaxable veteran’s benefits must be “grossed up” into gross income per § 16-916.01(d)(1)(X), which broadly captures “any nontaxable income” to reflect its practical economic value—regardless of income threshold. The statute’s plain text, the Court reasoned, demands accurate baseline computation before discretion kicks in. Specifically, excluding such benefits artificially deflates support obligations.
Second, the trial court abused discretion by summarily excluding the six-thousand-dollar medical expense after initial presentation, without explaining its reversal amid no new objection or evidentiary gap. Such unexplained shifts violate rational decision-making standards.
Third, the denial of attorney’s fees under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 37 (discovery noncompliance) and R. 68 (offer-of-judgment) warranted remand for proper factor analysis—considering reasonableness, bad faith, and comparative positions—rather than conclusory or inaccurate grounds.
This ruling strengthens predictability in D.C. family practice: it mandates full gross-income accounting (including non-taxables like veteran’s pay), reinforces Holland’s viability for affluent divorces, and underscores appellate scrutiny of sparse trial explanations on ancillary relief.
Practitioners should now cite Hershey when challenging—or defending—support calculations that omit tax-advantaged streams, or when seeking clearer reasoning on fees and extraordinary costs. The remand signals trial courts to document deviations meticulously, lest reversals follow.
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