De Factor Parent/Third Party Custody Actions: Legal Principles and Recent Relevant Court of Appeals Case:

In the District, the child custody statute extends rights upon third party and de factor parent custodians. That is, if an individual can establish by clear and convincing evidence that he/she is either a de facto parent or a third party custodian of a child – then the Statute allows for filing and litigating the custody action against the parent seeking order for grant of physical/legal custody to the third party custodian or to the de factor parent.

Specifically, de facto parent is defined as an individual who has either:

(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the child’s birth or adoption by the child’s parent; (ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent; and (iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement of the child’s parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents; or

(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody; (ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child relationship form between the child and the third party; (iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent; and (iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement of the child’s parent, or if there are 2 parents, both parents.

Subsequently, third party custodian may file or intervene in the pending custody action under the following criteria:

(A) The parent who is or has been the primary caretaker of the child within the past 3 years consents to the complaint or motion for custody by the third party;

(B) The third party has: (i) Lived in the same household as the child for at least 4 of the 6 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody, or, if the child is under the age of 6 months, for at least half of the child’s life; and (ii) Primarily assumed the duties and obligations for which a parent is legally responsible, including providing the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, financial support, and other care to meet the child’s needs; or

(C) The third party is living with the child and some exceptional circumstance exists such that relief under this chapter is necessary to prevent harm to the child; provided, that the complaint or motion shall specify in detail why the relief is necessary to prevent harm to the child.

The Statute also bestows upon the biological parents a rebuttable presumption of fitness or more specifically: that it is in the best interests of the children to reside with their parent. That custody with biological parent is presumed to be in the best interests of the children. In order for the court to grant custody to third party the court has to determine by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption in favor of custody with parent has been rebutted and that custody with the third party is in the best interests of the child.

The parental presumption is rebutted if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence existence of one or more of the below listed elements: (1) That the parents have abandoned the child or are unwilling or unable to care for the child; (2) That custody with a parent is or would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child; or (3) That exceptional circumstances, detailed in writing by the court, support rebuttal of the presumption favoring parental custody.

The Court of Appeals in W.H. v. D.W. (No. 11-FM-1334), with the opinion issued on October 13, 2013, considered action by the third party custodians biological brother and grandmother D.W. and J.W. against the biological father W.H. The Court determined that D.W. did qualify as a third party custodian, had rebutted the parental presumption by clear and convincing evidence, and if fact it was in the best interests of the children to reside with him rather than the natural father strictly considering the elements listed above.

The interesting aspect of the this ruling has to do with the grandmother J.W. and her standing to litigate in the matter and be joined in award of custody with D.W. The Court ironically found that J.W. did not qualify as either a third party custodian or a de facto parent strictly under the provisions listed and analyzed above. However, the court still found her inclusion permissible under two broadly stated provisions in the third party custody statutes with a plenary/inclusive language:

§ 16-831.04(a)(5) which essentially states that the court may issue any custody order as long as the court determines is in the best interests of the child.  And § 16-831.13 which states “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the ability of any person to seek custody of a child under any other statutory, common law, or equitable cause of action or to preempt any authority of the court to hear and adjudicate custody claims under the court’s common law or equitable jurisdiction.”

The Law Offices of David Stein specializes in complex and demanding child custody/support matters.

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The Court of Appeals in a recent decision issued on December 19, 2013, James M. Schools v. US (12-CM-1448) reversed the conviction for unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition. Specifically, the jury had convicted the appellant Schools of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.

Factually, the defendant was found in the back room of a two bedroom apartment during a search warrant. The apartment was occupied by other individuals, and although the defendant was found in control and possession of the narcotics found, the weapon and ammunition was stowed in a dresser with cloths in the dresser not belonging to the appellant.

Schools sought reversal of his convictions on the ground that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to show that he had constructively possessed the gun and the ammunition. That is, the jury could not have concluded beyond reasonable doubt that he knew about the firearm and ammunition or that he ―had the requisite intent to exercise dominion and control over them.

The government argued that the appellant constructively possessed the gun and ammunition. Accordingly, the government was required to prove that he ―(1) knew of the presence of the weapon, (2) The power to exercise dominion and control over it, and (3) intended to exercise dominion and control over it. Essentially, Schools argued on appeal that no reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the weapon because “it was hidden from view, he made no movement toward it, and he gave no ―other indication that he knew what was tucked away under some clothes inside, ―much less that the other criteria for constructive possession were satisfied.”

As a matter of law, constructive possession may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. There must be however more than mere presence on the premises where the weapon is found or the proximity to it to satisfy the test for constructive possession of the contraband. There must be an added link that along with proximity and knowledge establishes that the accused meant to exercise dominion or control over it. The Court of Appeals in pertinent parts reasoned that “[w]e do not think that inferences that appellant (1) knew of the presence of the firearm and ammunition hidden beneath someone’s clothing in the drawer and (2) intended to exercise dominion and control over them are reasonable inferences from the limited evidence the government presented.

The prosecutor argued in closing that appellant ―knew where that gun was because ―[i]t was his dresser, his clothes in it and referred to ―that dresser where he keeps his things, his clothes, but there actually was no evidence presented that the dresser (or the closet in the back bedroom) contained clothing belonging to appellant.” The Court also noteworthy defined that “[r]easonable doubt is a doubt arising from the evidence, or from a lack of evidence, after consideration of all the evidence.”

Ultimately, considering the totality of the circumstances, others residing in the apartment and having the same access as the appellant, no articles of clothing or link was establish between the appellant and the dresser (there was no finger print evidence either), and even the wallet found in the back room did not belong to the appellant – all considered – there was insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant had constructive possession of the weapon and thus reversal was warranted.

The Law Offices of David Stein is a preeminent DC based criminal and civil litigation firm.

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In another recent opinion issued by the Court of Appeals, the Court applied the same legal principles emphasized and enumerated in IN RE TA. L. (No. 11-FS-01217, 2013 WL 4779715), also recently issued on August 22, 2013 – but with entirely different outcome.

The Court in In RE TA. L., clearly re-established that when the biological parents have designated a preferred custodian, the trial court can only overcome their choice by finding with clear and convincing evidence that their choice is contrary to the best interests of the child.  There the Court ruled that the parents’ choice of custodian was not given sufficient consideration at trial and thus case remanded.

In the recent case though different set of facts were considered.  Here there were also competing petitions.  An adoption petition by the foster parents and a guardianship motion by the grandparents.  However, the determining factual difference in the most recent case was that the child was medically fragile.  The child was born with significant medical issues.  She required early on monitoring and treatment by specialists in pulmonology, ophthalmology, gastroenterology, and endocrinology.  The evidence established that the foster parents met or exceeded the child’s medical needs diligently keep track of all her medical appointments and progress.  Whereas the grandparents had not attended a single medical appointment with the child nor had fully demonstrated an understanding of the child’s medical needs.

Secondly, the child was placed with the foster parents almost her entire life – some four years.  The experts opined that the child had a parent-child relationship with the foster parents and grandparent-grandchild relationship with the grandparents.  That the child had a primary secured attachment to the foster parents, and it would be severely detrimental to remove the child.

There was also clear evidence that the foster parents had met the child’s educational needs whereas the grandparents lacked basic information regarding the child’s educational needs.

This case and the Court of Appeals ruling here suggests that even if the parent’s choice of custodian is found to be fit and able and willing to care for the child – underlying compelling facts such as ones enumerated here – may still tilt the balance in favor of the foster parents as the termination of parental rights elements established by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child to be removed from the foster parents.

The Law Offices of David Stein is the preeminent Family Law firm in Washington DC specializing on the intricacies of family law matters and issues.

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The recent Court of Appeals decision in Thomas v. United States on October 24, 2013, reiterates the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  The issue in the case was whether a retrial on certain counts was barred due to collateral estoppel.  Thomas was charged initially with five counts.  The first trial resulted in the jury acquitting Thomas of ADW (assault with deadly weapon) and PFCV (possession of firearm during crime of violence), but hung on CPWL (carrying a pistol without a license) and UA (unlawful possession of ammunition). The trial court declared a mistrial on those counts as well as the fifth count the FIP (unlawful possession of firearm by a felon).

The government on the retrial pursued the FIP, CPWL, and UA counts.  Thomas claimed that the government was collaterally estopped on both the CPWL and the FIP counts. The trial court ruled against Thomas and he was convicted on both the FIP and UA counts (government dismissed the CPWL).

The Court in applying the legal principles of collateral estoppel determined that the case requires remand.  The Court expounded on the doctrine “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” That “the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that ‘the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.’

In order to determine if a count was barred on retrial by the doctrine of collateral estoppel – the first trial record has to be examined considering all pleadings, evidence and instructions and closings at which the question is whether the jury could have acquitted the defendant on any count other than the one defendant is seeking to bar from retrial.  That is, if the facts and evidence necessitating conviction was considered by the jury in the first trial before verdict – then the defendant cannot be retried on the same facts and evidence the second time.

Thus on appeal Thomas argued that the jury in the first trial determined that he did not bring a gun to the altercation therefore, collateral estoppel barred retrial on the FIP count. That “the jury in the first trial at least decided that he did not pull out a gun during his encounter with the Lamar brothers, and therefore, collateral estoppel barred admittance of the evidence of assault in his second trial.”   The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case.

The doctrine of collaterial estoppel is an effective tool for criminal litigators to eliminate counts, facts and evidence already litigated or considered by the jury.

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In yet another recent case, it appears that the Court of Appeals has gradually shifted the standard of review in favor of the biological parent and the parental rights and preferences.  In the previously blogged and reviewed cases, the competing adoptions with a parental preference and a fit father’s custody filing — were both considered and analyzed – and in each of these recent cases, the Court had sided with the parental preference arguably raising the bar to overcome parental preferences and here to find neglect against a parent.

In IN RE K.M., decided on September 12, 2013, the Court reversed the neglect finding in favor of the mother diagnosed with delusional ideations, the prosecutorial type.

In this case, the mother LM was diagnosed to have suffered from delusional disorder.  Specifically the psychologists described the disorder as irrational and firmly fixed beliefs that LM was being harmed by others or that other people meant to hurt or to persecute her.

The two relevant statutory neglect provisions applicable were:

1)    D.C. Code § 16-2301 (9)(A)(ii) if the child is “without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his or her physical, mental, or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to the lack of financial means of his or her parent.” No finding of parental fault is required to establish neglect. In re N.P., 882 A.2d 241, 250 (D.C. 2005). The “relevant focus for the court . . . is the [child’s] condition, not the [mother’s] culpability.” In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 169.

2)    A child is neglected within the meaning of D.C. Code § 16-2301 (9)(A)(iii) if the child’s parent is “unable to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because of . . . mental incapacity.” Proof of mental incapacity alone is not sufficient; the government is required to “demonstrate the existence of a nexus between a parent’s [] mental incapacity and an inability to provide proper parental care.” In re N.P., 882 A.2d at 251.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court finding and also the District’s position that L.M.’s delusional disorder rendered L.M. unable to provide proper parental care for and control over K.M.

Essentially the Court reasoned that this case falls under those neglect cases that although the parent might have either a drug issue, or a mental health problem – the issue or problem does not rise to the level of neglect – as the court focused on the condition of the child.  That is, the causal link between the parent’s issues and the child’s condition does not justify a finding of neglect.

Here the Court found that the behavioral issues the child exhibited was after the removal.  Although LM had mental health issues, she provided sufficient care and control over KM in that KM was not a neglected child.  The home was appropriate, child attended school, and the child was not harmed in any tangible concrete way by the mother’s delusional ideations.  There was no expert evaluation of the child to determine whether the mother’s condition had impacted the child in any significant way.

Moreover, the Court appropriately emphasized that there was also no substantial or serious risk of harm to the child thus sustaining a neglect finding based on the evidence and forecast of a serious incurring harm.   Specifically, the Court expounded “[w]e conclude that the expert testimony in this case, which consisted almost entirely of speculation about what ‘could’ happen and general statements of concern about the parenting abilities of persons with delusional disorders, did not suffice to establish the substantial risk of serious injury necessary to support a finding of neglect based solely on a risk of future harm.”

This is a right decision and also at the right time.  In that the Court of Appeals is more rigorously expanding on the parental rights and preferences while curtailing and qualifying finding of neglect or the requisite legal standard used thereof.

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The recent Court of Appeals case on a competing adoption petition litigation issued on August 22, 2013 (citation below) defined with more specificity the meaning of “weighty consideration” given to parents’ choice of a fit custodian.  Here the parents whom have been adjudicated as having neglected their children consented to E.A., the great aunt’s adoption petition competing against W.s the foster parents.   The attachment study that was conducted did not factor or involved the children’s attachment to E.A.  In short, it was one sided attachment evaluation.  The study clearly established though a secure attachment to W.s – the foster parents.   The study also deemed the impact of removal as devastating.   Another bonding study conducted by the assessment center between the petitioners, parents and the children also favored the W.s – that the children were most attached to W.s. That removal from their home would possibly cause high risk of derailment.

It appears however that the Court’s opinion in the matter way swayed by Dr. Missar’s testimony, which only offered criticism of the two evaluations conducted.  That is “Dr. Frank was not in a position to offer an opinion about the children’s attachment to any party because she had only conducted an assessment of their bonding.  As for Dr. Venza’s evaluation, Dr. Missar found the primary limitation to be that he did not assess the children’s attachment to their biological family, including E.A.”

The Court in ruling that the trial court did not give weighty consideration to the parent’s preferred custodian stated: although the competing petitioner need not necessarily show that the preferred petitioner is unfit in order to prevail, if the preferred caregiver is a fit custodian, the competing petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence that the custodial arrangement with the preferred petitioner is “clearly contrary” to the children’s best interests.       Such evidence was lacking as there was no significant bonding study or an attachment study conducted involving the EA the parents’ choice.

In another word: if the petitioner preferred by the natural parents is fit suitable, and the custodial arrangement, including the relationship the natural parents will have with the child, will not harm the child, the award of custody to the preferred caregiver is, as a matter of law, in the child’s best interest.

In conclusion the Court ruled that absent a fair and equitable attachment and bonding study involving EA, the trial court cannot rule as a matter of law that there “is clear and convincing evidence in the record that a custodial relationship, preferred by the biological parents, with an otherwise fit and suitable caregiver would be clearly2 contrary to the children’s best interest merely because the children are found to be attached to the competing petitioner.”

This case is consistent with the Court of Appeals other recently published cases where the Court is requiring more deference by the trial court when there is either a fit parent ready to assume care, or a designated fit relative selected and preferred by the biological parents to assume care.  This case and its predecessors are clear signal that biological ties and deference cannot be easy overlooked or curtailed without significant consideration and as the Court words it “a weighty consideration.”





Nos. 11-FS-1217, 11-FS-1218, 11-FS-1255, 11-FS-1256, 11-FS-1257, 11-FS-1258, 11-FS-1259, 11-FS-1260

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The Court of Appeals on July 25, 2013 in IN RE ANG.P. & AND.P.; (Nos. 11-FS-1584 & 11-FS-1585), reversed the lower court finding of neglect against a biological mother who was charged with neglecting her children by leaving them without proper parenting, care and control.

The legal standard specifically provides: a child is neglected if he or she “is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care necessary for his or her physical, mental or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to the lack of financial means of his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.” D.C. Code § 16-2301 (9)(A)(ii). In addition, a child will be adjudicated neglected if his or her “parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization, or other physical or mental incapacity.” Id. § 16-2301 (9)(A)(iii). A finding of neglect under (iii) requires a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of a causal nexus between the parent’s mental or physical incapacity and his or her inability to provide proper parental care for the child. See In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 169 (D.C. 1998).

Factually, the mother who suffered from severe chronic back pain was charged with leaving her five year old daughter (And.P.) without proper care while she was transported to the hospital due to being rendered unconscious by her prescription pain medication.   There was also a fourteen year old in the home (Ang.P.) and another adult child.   A hot line report was filed and CFSA investigators also determine that there were other occasions that the mother was incapacitated due to being virtually disabled by her back pain, that the home was messy and cluttered, the children were not updated on immunization and missed school.

Essentially the Court determined that the facts as presented at the trial level were not sufficient to find neglect against the mother.  The evidence established that the five year old was in the care of the 14 year old when the mother was hospitalized.

Specifically the Court held: there is no evidence that And.P. was ever left alone without proper supervision. See Child and Family Services Agency Administrative Issuance No. 08-7 (December 24, 2008) (explaining that, depending upon the child’s maturity, a child over the age of ten can be left alone and a child over twelve may babysit). There was no evidence that Ang.P. lacked the maturity or skill to care for And.P. during the periods their mother was asleep. Indeed, there was evidence that Ang.P. helped out with chores at home, was able to do her own laundry, could bathe and prepare And.P. for the day, and was able to prepare small meals.”

The Court also ruled that somewhat dirty and cluttered home with no major safety issues would not rise to the level of neglect.  Even if, in addition, the mother did not have updated immunization record, or was late on certain utility bills, or even failed to ensure regular attendance of the five year old in the non-mandatory pre-kindergarten classes.

The case rightfully recognizes and highlights the working dynamics of the modern homes versus the traditional literal definitions of what constitutes neglect.  The Court focused on the condition of the children rather than the condition and disposition of the mother while factoring in the age and involvement of the older sibling in the home environment, a practical approach in construing the neglect statute.

The Law Offices of David Stein is the preeminent litigation firm specializing in all aspects of family law.

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The US Supreme Court on June 3, 2013 in Maryland v. King (No. 12–207) and in a 5-4 narrow decision legalized taking the arrestee’s DNA sample along with the fingerprinting and mug shots.

The case was initiated in the MD State court from the collection of DNA in 2009 from Alonzo Jay King Jr. after his arrest on assault charges in Wicomico County, Md.  King’s DNA sample collected by swabbing of his cheek, positive matched evidence from a 2003 rape case, and he was convicted of that crime which was unresolved. The MD Court of Appeals ruled that the State law authorizing collection of DNA from people who had been arrested but not yet convicted violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches.

The federal government and 28 other states authorize taking of the DNA sample and the government and the law enforcement officials have traditionally argued that such practice is an invaluable and indispensible in solving unresolved cold cases.

Justice Kennedy articulating the majority’s ruling opined “When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody […] taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  The majority also argued that such was necessary to identify the suspect that is: the “quick and painless” swabbing procedure was a search under the Fourth Amendment, meaning it had to be justified as reasonable under the circumstances given “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”

The Court further ruled that the DNA sampling “is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a previously unidentified suspect; or matching tattoos to known gang members to reveal a criminal affiliation; or matching the arrestee’s fingerprints to those recovered from a crime scene.”

Justice Scalia delivering a strongly worded dissent argued that the Fourth Amendment forbids searches and seizure without reasonable suspicion to gather evidence about an unrelated crime, a point the majority did not dispute but did not highlight either.  Specifically  “make no mistake about it: because of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”

He articulated further that the suspect’s (King) identification was never at issue as he was already identified by his full name, race, sex, height, weight, address, etc.  That the purpose of the MD law upheld by the majority was not for identification purposes but a tool for “an official investigation into a crime.”  The MD statue in question allowing DNA swapping was also limited for indentifying missing persons or human remains and not a sweeping authority to test all arrestees.  Justice Scalia argued “[s]olving crimes is a noble objective […] but it occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from suspicionless law enforcement searches.  The Fourth Amendment must prevail.”

He also pointed out that in reality after King’s conviction for the arrested offense, assault, as a convicted felon his DNA sample would have been collected regardless as all fifty states require such.  Thus no constitutional issue would have been present and the law enforcement would have obtained the DNA sample needed to solve the cold case.

On a more sardonic note Justice Scalia opined as a strict constitutionalist that: the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would not have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.

The majority opinion is troubling, as both the law enforcement agencies and now the high court have aligned on the side of more state intrusion, surveillance, and oversight.  The use of drones by the police outside and above private homes suspected of criminal activity has been deemed legal.  Recently the NSA practice of collecting and analyzing phone records of the population en mass was brought forward and under congressional scrutiny.  The question becomes when does the line between one’s constitutional and privacy rights and the state’s need to monitor its citizens become blurred and crossed.

Arguably — it already has.

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The Court of Appeals recently in IN RE KA (No. 10-FS-1614, Feb. 2013) reversed K.A.’s weapons possession charges focusing on the governing legal principles of convictions based on confessions alone and the necessary corroboration in support thereof.

The Court reiterated the long established Supreme Court legal principle, which requires confession to be corroborated in order to “forestall convictions based on extrajudicial confessions the reliability of which is a matter of suspicion.”

Essentially in cases were conviction is based solely on a confession, self made statement, the government is required to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement, such as forensic evidence or other independent testimony.   The rule was established also to prevent false confession “induced by some inner compulsion” and to preserve the reliability and the integrity of the criminal system.

In this case the police officers entered an apartment occupied by K.A., his brother, and their grandfather on an anonymous tip that an individual with a certain description possessed weapons in the apartment.  There were four other individuals in the apartment at the time.  The grandfather allowed search of the apartment and underneath his mattress two weapons were discovered.  The grandfather was handcuffed and due to an independent medical emergency an ambulance was called to assist the grandfather who was diabetic.  While the grandfather was handcuffed in fragile health, the officers encouraged KA to confess to the ownership of the weapons to spare his grandfather.  Eventually KA reluctantly admitted ownership by making a conclusory  statement “man, they my guns. Take those things off him.”  The confession was later repeated at the police station.  However the Court did not find the confession to be reliable or corroborated independently.  The Court reasoned that circumstances surrounding the confession were not sufficiently corroborative or reliable.   The confession was made after repeated questioning of the officers while they had the medically fragile grandfather in handcuffs.  The statement alone was conclusory.  KA only described basis description color and shape of the weapons not make and model or the location there were to be found.  The police officer had let another individual –who fit the description of the owner of the weapons based on the anonymous tip — leave the apartment and had not detained him.  This was an important fact as the description provided by the tipster did not match KA.  The government did not provide any other corroborating evidence such as prints, or other supporting forensic evidence.

The Court concluded in stating: while the corroboration rule does not require that the government prove all of the elements of the crime through independent evidence, it does require that the independent evidence be sufficient to make the confession worthy of an inference of truth.  Here the confession was made in an inherently unreliable circumstances, produced by a significant amount of police pressure and what we reasonably conclude was K.A.’s desire to spare his visibly ill grandfather a criminal charge and a trip to jail.

The Law Offices of David Stein specializes in complex criminal litigation in which at times subtle legal nuances can be the difference between an acquittal or a conviction.

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This blog highlights some of the drastic changes to the drinking and driving law in the District.  The DC Comprehensive Impaired Driving Act of 2012 increased significantly (doubled) the penalties for drinking and driving and also increased the mandatory minimum sentences as such.

Accordingly the first offense conviction on DUI/DWI now carries the same penalties as most criminal misdemeanors, a maximum of: 180 days/$1000 fines.

The minimum statutory imposed incarceration even for the first time offenders was also doubles based on the blood alcohol level/content commonly referred to as BAC.  That is a BAC of 0.08 or more is considered per se intoxication and will results in a DWI or/and a DUI charge.  If the BAC level on the first offense is between 0.20-.25 there is a mandatory 10 days incarceration.  Between 0.25-.30 you will be facing 15 days mandatory time and more than .30 — 20 days on a first offense.

If there is a prior drinking and driving conviction in this or any other jurisdictions, then the penalties would increase to a one year incarceration and fines between $2500-$5000 and 10 days mandatory minimum.  If the BAC between 0.20-.25, 15 days mandatory time, 20 days if BAC is between 0.25-.30 and 25 days of time if BAC is .30 or more.

Two prior convictions then the penalties even increase significantly higher: fines between $2500-$10,000, one year incarceration and 15 days of mandatory sentence with increase of 20 additional days of mandatory time if the BAC is between 0.20-.25, and 25 days for BAC between .25-.30, and an additional 30 days of mandatory time if BAC more than 0.30.

Additional 30 days of mandatory to the penalties enumerated in the paragraph above if there are three prior convictions.

The penalties for Operating while impaired (OWI), the lesser included offense to DUI, did also double.  First offense: $500 fine and maximum of 90 days.  Second offense: fines no less than $1000, and no more than $2500 with the maximum incarceration increased to one year and mandatory five days of jail time.  With two or more OWI convictions penalties increase to fines no less than $1000 and no more than $5000 and incarceration no more than one year, with the mandatory jail time increased to 10 days.

OWI is defines as “person’s ability to operate or be in physical control of a vehicle is impaired by consumption of alcohol….”

If the BAC at the time of arrest is less than 0.50 then there is a rebuttable presumption that the person operating the vehicle was not under the influence of alcohol.  If the BAC is between 0.50-0.80 there is a prima facie proof and presumption that the person was under the influence (DUI).  Thus BAC at 0.50 or more would result is an OWI or DUI charge and more than 0.80 (per se intoxication) a DWI charge.  If there are no chemical test results and a refusal, then the officer upon observation and the field sobriety test results may charge both DWI and DUI or DUI and OWI.

The chemical test to determine alcohol level may be by blood, urine or breath.  An official copy of the results by the technician is admissible as substantive evidence without the collaboration or testimony of the technician or the police officer.  Provided that there is a certification attached thereto with the breathalyzer attesting that within the past three months the machine was tested and found to be accurate, and moreover, the test was conducted in accordance with the manufacturer’s standards.  With blood and urine tests, certification by the chief toxicologist that the test is accurate.  The testimony of the technician or the police officer certifying test results can be compelled as long as it is requested in writing within 15 days prior to the scheduled trial date, and it is articulated why the test results is inaccurate.

The new law makes the District one of the toughest jurisdictions when it comes to drinking and driving.  The statute also ties the hands of judges as the minimum sentences are articulated clearly to be mandatory and not discretionary.

Thus the chemical test results and validity thereof becomes a major factor.  Due to the general unreliability of the breathalyzer tests, and the challenge-ability of the results, more police officer are conducting blood and urine tests, which are traditionally more accurate and reliable.

There is no replacement however for impeccable trial skills in cases as such.  Before the amendment to the statute, a guilty verdict would have resulted in probation whereas the same case now most likely will result in a mandatory jail time.

The Law Offices of David Stein is the premier Washington DC based boutique litigation firm.  Litigation comes to us naturally and solutions abound.  Contact our offices today for a case evaluation.

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